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THE CARIBBEAN SECURITY SCENARIO AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY: CONTINUITY, CHANGE, CHALLENGE

Ivelaw L. Griffith

This assessment of the Caribbean's contemporary security landscape finds the region facing both traditional and nontraditional challenges. Border and territorial disputes and geopolitics typify the traditional issues, while drugs, crime, terrorism, and HIV/AIDS are the most salient nontraditional ones.

This Agenda Paper suggests that in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States, the geographic proximity of the Caribbean offers a new dimension to U.S. national security sensitivities, as the U.S. homeland is vulnerable to "penetration" from the Caribbean. Thus, it is important to consider the location of the Caribbean in the new U.S. Homeland Security architecture.

Author Ivelaw L. Griffith argues that for reasons related to smallness, capability limitations, vulnerability, and the nature of the security challenges facing the Caribbean, a multidimensional strategy is the only credible one security elites and practitioners there can adopt. He proposes the concept of the *Multilateral Security Engagement Zone* as an analytic construct to probe regional and international engagement and examines problems of prioritization, institutionalization, and cooperation that arise from pursuits within engagement zones.

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The Caribbean Security Scenario at the Dawn of the 21st Century: Continuity, Change, Challenge

Ivelaw L. Griffith

These three characteristics — proximity, vulnerability, and instability — make the region of special concern to the United States.
— Robert A. Pastor[1]

Today, we live in the shadow of September 11. That horrific tragedy has cast a pall across the whole hemisphere.
— Prime Minister Owen Arthur[2]

Introduction

The two epigraphs — one by a noted scholar and erstwhile policyactor and the other by a respected policymaker with intellectual acumen — capture core elements of the twin realities of continuity and change that define the security scenario of the contemporary Caribbean. Proximity, vulnerability, and instability are not new features of the Caribbean or of Caribbean-United States dynamics; they represent some of the continuity from times past. However, they assume special character because of the terrorism tragedy that has "cast a pall across the whole hemisphere," to quote Barbados Prime Minister Arthur.

Vulnerability helps to set the stage for conditions that aid instability and accentuate other features of the Caribbean security landscape. Proximity to the United States has several well-known geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages. However, geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geonarcotics risks also exist. Recently, some of the risks have been heightened by the terrorism threats facing the United States. Thus, the context and content of the security challenges facing the Caribbean are influenced by the terrorism and other threats to the United States. Moreover, those threats accentuate the vulnerability of the region, partly because of its proximity to the United States and partly because of the economic and other ties between the two.

Needless to say, the continuity and change realities to which Robert Pastor and Owen Arthur refer are not the only ones that define the region or its interface with the United States. Moreover, those realities alone do not explain fully the current security scenario of the region. In other words, while an appreciation of those factors is necessary to understand the contemporary Caribbean security scene, it is not sufficient for such an undertaking. Thus, the modest attempt here to offer an insight into the region's security dynamics in this time of geopolitical and other changes pays attention first to some of the structural and definitional elements that underline Caribbean security. This is followed by a brief examination of some key traditional and nontraditional challenges. Finally, the focus turns to some regional response considerations as states cope with the challenges to their security and sovereignty.

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Understanding the Scenario

Caribbean states share with all states existence in an international system characterized by what international relations scholars call "anarchy" and increasing complex interdependence. Yet, Caribbean states possess a feature that is not common to all states in the international system: they are small states in terms of territory and population, as well as in most — and in some cases, all — elements of national power and state capacity. This structural feature accentuates their vulnerability, helping to explain aspects of economic and political instability.

Small and Vulnerable

It is obvious from Figure 1 and Table 1 that there are intra-regional asymmetries within the Caribbean: that Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica are territorial and population "giants" compared to St. Kitts-Nevis, Grenada, Barbados, and other countries; that several countries do not fit the conventional definition of a small state based on total population, which is having a population of 1.5 million or fewer citizens.[3] However, it is also evident from Table 1 that when the capability profiles of the various states are considered overall, the characterization of the region as one comprising small states is more than justified. But, what exactly is meant by vulnerability — this structural reality that is accentuated by smallness?

Vulnerability arises when geographic, political, economic, or other factors cause a nation's security to be compromised. Usually, it is not a function of one factor, but several, that combine to reduce or remove a state's influence or power, thereby opening it up to internal subversion or external incursion, among other things. Some writers feel that small states are "inherently vulnerable" because they can be perceived as potentially easy victims for external aggression.[4] But the perception of other states is merely part of the matter. Vulnerability also relates to objective geographical, economic, political, and organizational deficiencies, such as populations too small to meet security needs, limited funds to acquire defense-related material, and fragile economies.

In the economic area, it is fairly easy to understand the basis for the vulnerability assessment. A brief explanation will suffice. The Caribbean has some valuable natural resources, including oil, bauxite, gold, and diamonds. But these exist in just a few countries. For instance, only Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela have large quantities of oil; Barbados, Cuba, and Suriname, to a much lesser extent, have oil industries, although there are refining and transshipment operations in many countries. Bauxite is produced only in the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname. Diamonds are mined only in Guyana, and only Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, and Suriname produce gold. This limited mineral resource availability partly explains why the regional economies revolve around a narrow economic base of a) agriculture, mainly sugar and bananas; b) mining and manufacturing, notably bauxite, oil, gold, and apparel; and c) services, mostly offshore financing and tourism.

The economic vulnerability is not only functional, but also structural: economies suffer from heavy reliance on foreign trade, limited production

Figure 1. Map of the Caribbean Basin

Table 1. Capability Profile of Caribbean States

Country	Size (km2)	Population	Armed Forces*	Police Force	GNP per Capita	GDP Growth Rate	Foreign Debt ($M)	Foreign Debt as % of Exports
Antigua-Barbuda	440	72,310	170	552	8,108	3.3	401.1	4.2
Bahamas	13,942	302,000	860	2.046	15,894	4.5	381.3	2.7
Barbados	432	268,000	610	1,240	9,701	4.8	507.8	4.4
Belize	22,960	249,800	1,050	776	2,912	8.2	413.3	12.9
Cuba	110,860	11,200,000	46,000	20,000	2,134 pesos	1.3	NA	NA
Dominica	750	71,529	None	442	3,178	0.7	98.7	5.1
Dominican Republic	48,442	8,600,000	24,500	15,000	2,291	7.7	NA	NA
Grenada	345	101,000	None	719	3,317	6.4	129.2	4.3
Guyana	214,970	863,000	1,600	3,570	831	2.5	1,193.1	7.8
Haiti	27,750	7,952,000	None	5,300	478	1.1	NA	NA.
Jamaica	11,424	2,606,000	2,830	7,756	2,840	0.8	3,375.3	13.4
St. Kitts-Nevis	269	44,000	120	384	7,220	2.6	138.6	16.0
St. Lucia	616	155,996	None	716	3,705	2.8	137.2	4.7
St. Vincent & Grenadines	388	111,821	None	789	2,539	2.1	159.3	5.6
Suriname	163,270	415,000	2,040	1,064	2,139	-0.8	NA	NA
Trinidad-Tobago	5,128	1,294,000	2,700	5,507	6,182	7.9	1,679.8	7.8

Notes: * = Active forces only All figures are for 2000. NA - Not available

Sources: Caribbean Development Bank, *Annual Report 2001*, March 2002; Association of Caribbean States, *Consolidation of the Greater Caribbean* (ACS Secretariat, 2001); International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2001/02*. (London, 2001); Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police, 2003.

and export diversification, low savings, heavy dependence on foreign capital, and a dearth of capable people who have economic and management skills, among other things. Much of this vulnerability has been highlighted recently, as some countries suffered setbacks in the garment and tourism industries and as others faced a threat to their banana market guarantees. Moreover, the Caribbean Development Bank reported, "9/11 reemphasized the structural weaknesses of economies in the region and their vulnerability to external shocks. Growth was already slowing in many Caribbean economies when the closure of U.S. airspace to flights for some days and, following the resumption of air operations, the sharp decline in air travel as a result of air safety concerns, caused a massive and unprecedented reduction in tourist arrivals in Caribbean destinations."[5]

Needless to say, Caribbean countries' vulnerability is not limited to the economic area. One Caribbean leader once offered an eloquent description of the structural and multidimensional character of the vulnerability facing states in the region: "Our vulnerability is manifold. Physically, we are subject to hurricanes and earthquakes; economically, to market conditions taken elsewhere; socially, to cultural penetration; and now politically, to the machinations of terrorists, mercenaries, and criminals."[6] This description is over a decade old, but it still resonates powerfully with the structural and functional realities of the region. Furthermore, this multidimensional vulnerability is intimately linked with the security realities currently facing the region. Yet, this observation begs a question similar to the one posed earlier in relation to the term "vulnerability": what do we mean by "security"?

What Security, Whose Security?

The term "security" has been defined in many different ways in studies on national and international security. Most of the definitions have centered on some core concepts: international anarchy, survival, territorial integrity, and military power. Further, the definitions have largely shared a common theoretical foundation in traditional Realism. Although there are different variants of Realism, the common denominators are that they focus on the state as the unit of analysis, stress the competitive character of relations among states, and emphasize the military and, to a letter extent, the political aspects of security. This approach pays attention principally to "great powers," is oriented

to the international arena, sees states as national actors rationally pursuing their interests in that arena, and considers military power capabilities as the most critical ones.[7]

For most of the post-World War II period there was wide consensus among political scientists and military theorists that traditional Realist theory provided the appropriate conceptual architecture to examine questions of security. As might be expected, this paradigm was challenged, but not concertedly. However, the vicissitudes of international politics since the end of the Cold War have led many scholars to pursue concerted journeys beyond the traditional Realist paradigm in conceptualizing and probing security issues. A decade ago one scholar, himself an erstwhile proponent of Realism, averred: "Realism, rooted in the experiences of World War II and the Cold War, is undergoing a crisis of confidence largely because the lessons adduced do not convincingly apply directly to the new realities. The broadened global agenda goes beyond what realism can realistically be expected to address."[8]

As might be expected, the "horrific tragedy," to use Prime Minister Arthur's term, has served further to undermine confidence in the utility of the traditional Realist approach to security. As Robert Keohane observed recently, "The globalization of informal violence has rendered problematic our conventional assumptions about security threats. It should also lead us to question the classical realist distinction between important parts of the world, in which great powers have interests, and insignificant places, which were thought to present no security threats although they may raise moral dilemmas."[9] However, this rethinking about traditional Realism does not represent its total debunking. I believe that the 1991 remark by distinguished scholar Richard Falk still holds true in 2003: "To challenge the centrality of realism does not imply its total repudiation. States do remain important actors, war does remain profoundly relevant to international relations, and many international settings can be better understood as collisions of interests and antagonistic political forces."[10]

For the Caribbean, the departure from reliance on traditional Realist paradigm predated the end of the Cold War and the arrival of the "age of terror."[11] I myself define security as the protection and preservation of a people's freedom from external military attack and coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished political, economic, and social values. These values include democratic choice and political stability in the political area, sustainable development and free enterprise in the economic domain, and social equality and respect for human rights in the social arena.[12] Thus, security in the Caribbean is multidimensional, with military, political, economic, and other dimensions. As one Caribbean statesman asserted, and quite rightly: "It would be a fundamental error on our part to limit security concerns to any one area while the scourge of HIV/AIDS, illegal arms and drug trafficking, transnational crime, ecological disasters, and poverty continue to stare us in the face."[13]

Not surprisingly, the Caribbean is not the only area within the Americas (or the world, as a matter of fact) where definitional adaptation has been driven by changing or different realities. In this respect, the well-regarded *Strategic Assessment*, by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, makes an observation that warrants full replication:

> The international security system emerging in the Americas at the end of the [twentieth] century de-emphasizes the need to balance power against other states, perfect military deterrence, or seek collective defense arrangements against threats from outside the hemisphere. This approach to security has been eclipsed by threats to the domestic order challenging the state's ability to hold the country together and to govern. These threats can be divided into three categories: [1] Natural disasters, including the aftermath that can be worse that the disaster itself, and environmental degradation; [2] domestic threats, such as poverty, socio-economic inequality, ordinary crime, social violence, and illegal migration; [3] the challenge of private actors — terrorist factions, international organized crime (trafficking drugs, weapons, goods, people), and nonstate armies (ideologically focused organizations, paramilitary groups, and modern-day pirates simply seeking wealth and personal power). Governments face security problems that are multidimensional and localized.[14]

Assessing the Challenges

In light of our approach to security and the realities of smallness and vulnerability, what are some critical issues on the security landscape of the contemporary Caribbean?

The Traditional Security Landscape

The region's security landscape is one with traditional and nontraditional security challenges. In the traditional area, border and territorial dis-

Table 2. Border and Territorial Disputes Involving Caribbean Countries

Parties in Dispute	Kind of Dispute	Brief Background and Spring 2003 Status
Antigua–Barbuda and France (Guadeloupe)	Maritime	Dispute reported with St.Bartholemy, details unavailable. Antigua and Barbuda also objects to the treaties signed by France, the Netherlands, and the United States, recognizing Venezuela's claims to the Aves Islands.
Belize and Guatemala	Land	Unilateral territorial dispute: Guatemala claims half of Belize's territory south of the Sibun River, based on an unfulfilled 1859 treaty. A referendum based on OAS negotiations in 2002 that created an adjustment at the Mexico tripoint, a broad Caribbean passage, aid package was not brought to a vote in Guatemala and postponed in Belize.
Belize and Guatemala	Maritime	At present, Guatemalan access to the Caribbean is closed off by Belize's and Honduras's territorial seas. In 2002, Guatemala did not bring the land and maritime boundary referendum forward for a popular vote over concerns of rejection. Historically, Belize objects to Guatemala's historic bay claim to the Bahia de Amatique and to linking its land boundary claims to resolution of the maritime boundary.
Belize and Honduras	Land	Honduran claims to Sapodilla Cays off Belize coast pending resolution of Belize-Guatemala dispute, which proposed an international marine park.
Belize and Honduras	Maritime	No disputes identified except for Honduran claim to Sapodilla Cays. Under the OAS-negotiated Belize-Guatemala referendum, Belize and Honduras agree to create a maritime corridor for Guatemala. Referendum has not been brought to a vote.
Colombia and Honduras	Maritime	Island disputes prevent signing. Agreement cedes Serranilla Bank to Colombia, which Jamaica, Nicaragua, and the U.S. also claim, together with Bajo Nuevo (Petrel Bank). Nicaragua disputes the legitimacy of this agreement as it disputes Colombia's claim to waters east of 82°W (see Colombia-Nicaragua).
Colombia and Jamaica	Maritime	Two circles cut out of JRA for disputed Serranilla Bank and Bajo Nuevo (Low Cays). Features also claimed by U.S., Honduras, Nicaragua.
Colombia and Nicaragua	Land	Territorial dispute: Nicaragua claims and occupies San Andrés and Providencia islands; Albuquerque, Este-Sudeste, Roncador Cays; and the Quito Sueño and Serrana Banks on the Nicaragua Rise. During Sandinista rule, Nicaragua rejected all Colombian maritime and island claims east of 82°W, based on 1928 Treaty. Nicaragua claims, without contest, and occupies Corn Islands (Islas del Maiz). U.S. relinquished all claims on these features in 1970s. Serranilla Bank, Bajo Nuevo (Petrel Bank) are claimed by parties along with Honduras, Jamaica, and U.S., who reserve the right to claim these features.
Colombia and Nicaragua	Maritime	During Sandinista rule, Nicaragua rejected all Colombian maritime and island claims east of 82°W based on 1928 Barcemas-Esquerra Treaty, arguing that treaty was signed under pressure during U.S. occupation. In 1988, Nicaraguan government maintained claim but accepts Colombian de facto occupation. (See also Colombia-Honduras)
Colombia and Panama (Caribbean Sea)	Maritime	Equidistance was not considered vis-à-vis the Colombian-claimed islands. Panama retains a dormant claim to the Colombian-claimed islands as they were once attached to Panama when it was a province of Colombia prior to 1903.
Colombia and United States	Land	Territorial dispute: Both states claim Serranilla Bank and Bajo Nuevo together with Honduras, Jamaica and Nicaragua.

Parties in Dispute	Kind of Dispute	Brief Background and Spring 2003 Status
Colombia and Venezuela	Land	Territorial dispute: Both states claim Los Monjes Islands despite 1980 bilateral agreement to award them to Venezuela. Numerous land boundary disputes, particularly related to Goajirá Peninsula, now largely resolved: Swiss (1922) arbitration resulted in successful demarcation in 1932. Borderland issues include illegal border crossings, Colombian migration, drug-weapons smuggling, and general lawlessness.
Colombia and Venezuela	Maritime	Venezuela occupied Los Monjes Islands in 1950s. Still issue of contention despite 1980 agreement to grant them to Venezuela with limited Colombian rights in the Gulf of Venezuela (Golfo de Coquibacoa). Attempts to come to an agreement on maritime boundary around islands and to establish a bay closing line have failed with periodic resurgence of angry rhetoric. Colombia and other states protest Venezuelan closing line in gulf based on "a historic bay, a condominium of two riparian states."
Cuba and Haiti	Maritime	Haiti claims ownership of Navassa Island, and Cuba rejects U.S. claim over Navassa Island. Boundary is configured as if Navassa were Haitian, connecting to Cuba-Jamaica boundary.
Cuba and United States (Guantánamo)	Land	Cuba protests U.S. presence on territory; $3,300/year lease of 118 sq km until lease runs out in 2033 (no U.S. checks cashed since 1962 missile crisis). Heavily fortified boundary.
Cuba and United States (Navassa Island)	Maritime	Cuba together with Haiti protest U.S. administration of Navassa island off the coast of Haiti. Cuba and Jamaica ignore U.S. claim in delimitation of joint maritime boundary.
Dominica and Venezuela (Aves Islands)	Maritime	Dominica protests Venezuelan claim to the Aves Islands as a base point for claiming EEZ rights. It considers the features rocks and not islands.
France (French Guiana) and Suriname	Land	Territorial dispute stemming from which upstream tributary of the Morouini(Maroni)/Litani(Itany) forms boundary. Colonial rulers submitted dispute to Russian Czar (1891) and The Hague (1905). Suriname after independence (1975) adopted the Dutch line but later was willing to agree to the French line (1977) in return for joint development aid. Recent agreement awaits ratification, resolving dispute.
Guatemala and Honduras	Maritime	Belize and Honduras are willing to share a maritime corridor with Guatemala under terms of OAS-negotiated agreement. Guatemala contests Honduras' claim under the 'Maritime Areas of Honduras Act' to Sapodilla Cays, also claimed and administered by Belize.
Guyana and Suriname	Land	Boundary dispute over which upper tributary (New River or Cutari/Curuni) of Courentyne (Corantijn) constitutes primary channel, resulting in Suriname territorial claim over New River triangle in southeast Guyana. Cutari had been historical boundary until an 1841 discovery proving Cutari larger. 1939 treaty never signed, and dispute became more acute after Suriname independence in 1975. A new map showing Suriname's claim on the New River triangle has frustrated negotiations, but the parties continue talking.
Guyana and Suriname	Maritime	Dispute over direction of maritime line extending from Courentyne (Corantijn) River and exact location of river's shoreline terminus. Suriname asserts a continental shelf claim directed 10° east of the meridian, and Guyana at 33.° Oil prospecting is inhibited. In 2000, Suriname's gunboats halted Guyanese-sponsored oil prospecting in the disputed wedge.
Guyana and Venezuela	Land	Territorial and boundary dispute over Essequibo. Venezuela claims the river is a natural boundary and not the 1844 Schomburgk line, which U.K. declared as boundary in 1886. A 1899 U.S. arbitration resulted in bilateral concessions and demarcation in 1905. Venezuela reasserted Essequibo River claims in 1951 but in 1970 signed a 12-year moratorium with U.K. and independent (1966) Guyana. Venezuela refuses to renew the moratorium, surfacing and abating claims periodically.

Parties in Dispute	Kind of Dispute	Brief Background and Spring 2003 Status
Guyana and Venezuela	Maritime	Territorial dispute over Essequibo region prevents definition of a maritime boundary, inhibiting oil prospecting. Until the recent domestic turmoil in Venezuela, which has put the boundary dispute in hiatus, the parties had been engaged in cordial discussions. Even Guyanese seizure of Venezuelan fishing vessels for illegal fishing in 2002 did not elevate tensions.
Haiti and Jamaica	Maritime	Negotiations are planned, but Haiti's claim to U.S.-administered Navassa Island prevents creation of maritime boundary at Cuba-Haiti, Cuba-Jamaica tripoint.
Haiti and United States	Maritime	Sovereignty dispute over Navassa Island prevents establishment of maritime boundary. The U.S. has not yet determined the limits of the fishery conservation zone around the island.
Honduras and Jamaica	Land	Territorial dispute: both states claim Bajo Nuevo and Serranilla Bank together with Colombia, Nicaragua, and U.S.
Honduras and Jamaica	Maritime	States have negotiations underway with resolution complicated by Serranilla Banks/Bajo Nuevo dispute also claimed by Colombia, Nicaragua, and the United States.
Honduras and Nicaragua (Caribbean Sea)	Maritime	In 1986, Honduras and Colombia signed the Caribbean Sea Maritime Limits Treaty, establishing a maritime boundary along the parallel as an extension of the Honduras-Nicaragua land boundary beyond the 82° meridian. Nicaragua protested treaty and subsequent Maritime Areas of Honduras Act and claimed Honduras placed troops on Cayo Sur. In 1999, Nicaragua petitioned the ICJ to resolve the boundary disputes among the three parties. As an interim measure, the OASfacilitates the disputants signing a Memorandum of Understanding (2000) and a confidence and security document (2001) to ease tensions. ICJ recently ruled in favor of Honduras' petition against Nicaragua's 35 percent tariff on Honduran imports to retaliate against Honduras's maritime treaty with Colombia. Main ICJ boundary ruling pending.
Honduras and United States	Land	Territorial dispute: both states claim Bajo Nuevo and Serranilla Bank together with Colombia, Jamaica, and Nicaragua
Jamaica and Navassa Island (United States)	Land	Territorial dispute: Jamaica appears to recognize Haiti's claim to Navassa Island by connecting its maritime boundary with Cuba to the Cuba-Haiti maritime boundary (that rejects the U.S. claim).
Jamaica and Nicaragua	Land	Territorial dispute: both states claim Bajo Nuevo and Serranilla Bank together with Colombia, Honduras, U.S.
Jamaica and Nicaragua	Maritime	States have negotiations planned pending resolution of the Serranilla Banks/Bajo Nuevo dispute also claimed by Colombia, Nicaragua, and the United States and resolution of disputed islands claimed by Nicaragua and occupied by Colombia.
Jamaica and United States	Land	Territorial dispute: both states claim Bajo Nuevo and Serranilla Bank together with Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
Nicaragua and United States	Land	Territorial dispute: Both states claim Bajo Nuevo and Serranilla Bank together with Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua.
St. Kitts-Nevis and Venezuela (Aves Islands)	Maritime	Saint Kitts and Nevis sent letter to the UN protesting the Venezuelan claim to the Aves Islands as a base point for claiming EEZ rights. It considers the features rocks and not islands.
St. Lucia and Venezuela (Aves Islands)	Maritime	Saint Lucia sent letter to the UN protesting the Venezuelan claim to Aves Island as a base point for claiming EEZ rights. It considers the features to be rocks and not islands. Saint Lucia also objects to the treaties signed by France, the Netherlands, and the United States, recognizing Venezuela's claims to the Aves Islands.

Parties in Dispute	Kind of Dispute	Brief Background and Spring 2003 Status
Saint Martin [France (Guadeloupe)] – Sint Maarten [Netherlands Antilles (Leeward Islands)]	Land	Reported dispute over terminus of boundary. Only "Schengen" European Union boundary in Western Hemisphere without customs or immigration controls. The boundary is governed by the 1648 Treaty of Concordia. Saint Martin is part of the French Overseas Department of Guadeloupe.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Venezuela	Maritime	Territorial dispute: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines sent letter to the UN protesting the Venezuelan claim to Aves Island as a base point for claiming EEZ rights. It considers the features to be rocks and not islands. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines objects to the treaties signed by France, the Netherlands, and the United States, recognizing Venezuela's claims to the Aves Islands.

Notes: EEZ=Exclusive Economic Zone; ICJ=International Court of Justice; JRA=Joint Regime Area.

Source: Raymond Milefsky, "Territorial Disputes and Regional Security in the Caribbean Basin," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror*, ed. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, forthcoming 2004).

putes and geopolitics are the core concerns. However, space limitations preclude attention here to geopolitics.[15]

Table 2 points to the existence of border and territorial disputes involving several states within the Caribbean Basin. Both land and maritime controversies are involved. It is important to note that although the term "border disputes" generally is used to refer to the controversies over land and sea, the disputes in which Caribbean states are involved are not all border disputes, which are controversies between and among states over the alignment of land or maritime boundaries. Some controversies, such as those between Venezuela and Guyana and between Suriname and Guyana, are really territorial disputes: controversies arising from claims to land or maritime territory. As might be expected, some territorial disputes derive from controversies over border alignment. The most serious disputes in the region involve Venezuela and Guyana, Suriname and Guyana, and Belize and Guatemala, and, as Table 2 shows, some countries are involved in several disputes. For example, Guyana is facing a claim by Venezuela for the western five-eighths of its 214,970 km^2 territory, and one by Suriname for 15,000 km^2 to the east.

For the last several years in the Caribbean, statesmen and scholars have placed a higher premium on nontraditional security issues than on traditional ones. Matters in the latter category have not been unimportant; rather, nontraditional challenges have been more salient. What, then, are some of the clear and present dangers facing Caribbean countries in the non-traditional area?

The Nontraditional Security Landscape

Drugs, crime, political instability, HIV/AIDS, and poverty are the chief nontraditional security concerns. There is no uniformity in the importance policymakers or security practitioners ascribe to these issues. There also is no uniformity in their impact on states and societies in the region. Also noteworthy is that these issues have both domestic and international elements; they are largely transnational in nature. Public security issues are especially prominent. Understandably, all the salient issues cannot be considered here, but a few deserve some attention. The issue of drugs tops the list.

Drugs

The Caribbean lies at "the Vortex of the Americas"; it is a bridge or front between North and South America. European actors recognized the strategic importance of this vortex soon after the 1492 encounter between Europe and the Americas. This strategic importance has persisted over the centuries, and it was dramatized in geopolitical terms during the Cold War. However, the region's strategic value lies not only in its geopolitical significance as viewed by state actors engaged in conflict and cooperation. Over recent decades, the region also has been viewed as strategic by nonstate drug actors, also with conflict and cooperation in mind, not in terms of geopolitics but geonarcotics.

The concept of geonarcotics suggests the dynamics of three factors besides drugs: geography, power, and politics. As Figure 2 reveals, it posits, first, that the narcotics phenomenon is multidimensional, with four main problem areas (drug production, consumption-abuse, trafficking,

Figure 2. Geonarcotics: A Framework



Notes: P= production; T= trafficking; C-A= consumption-abuse; ML= money laundering; MNCs= multinational corporations; INGOs= international nongovernmental organizations; IGOs= international governmental organizations; NGOs= nongovernmental organizations.

Source: Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

and money-laundering); second, that these problem areas give rise to actual and potential threats to the security of states around the world; and third, that the drug operations and the activities they spawn precipitate both conflict and cooperation among various state and nonstate actors in the international system.

Geography is a factor because of the global dispersion of drug operations and because certain physical, social, and political geography features of many countries facilitate drug operations. *Power* involves the ability of individuals and groups to secure compliant action. In the drug world, this power is both state and nonstate in origin, and in some cases nonstate sources command relatively more power than states. *Politics* revolves around resource allocation in terms of the ability of power brokers to determine who gets what, how, and when. Since power in this milieu is not only state power, resource allocation is correspondingly not exclusively a function of state power-holders. Moreover, politics becomes perverted and more perverted where it already was so.

The geonarcotics milieu involves a variety of state and nonstate actors, which differ in how they affect and are affected by the various problems and in their countermeasures. Drug operations generate two basic kinds of interactions: cooperation and conflict. These are bilateral and multilateral, and do not all involve force. Some involve nonmilitary pressures, such as economic and political sanctions by the United States against countries that it considers not proactive enough in fighting drugs. Some actors engage simultaneously in both cooperation and conflict. The relationships between the United States and Colombia and United States and Mexico over the last decade and between the United States and Jamaica during the late 1990s reveal this.

The geonarcotics approach does not view the "war on drugs" purely as a military matter. Hence, the application of military countermeasures alone is considered impractical. Moreover, international countermeasures are necessary, especially since all states, even rich and powerful ones, face resource constraints. However, collaboration among states may result in conflicts over sovereignty and varying perceptions of the nature and severity of threats and, therefore, conflicts over appropriate responses.[16] The geonarcotics relationship between the Caribbean and the rest of the world, especially North America, perhaps, is best known in relation to drug trafficking. However, the relationship entails more than the movement of drugs from and through the region; involved also are drug production, drug consumption and abuse, money laundering, organized crime, corruption, arms trafficking, and sovereignty conflicts, among other things.

Thus, what generally is called "the drug problem" in the Caribbean really is a multidimen-

sional phenomenon. However, the phenomenon does not constitute a security matter simply because of its multidimensionality. It presents threats to security essentially for four reasons. First, the operations have multiple consequences and implications — such as marked increases in crime, systemic and institutionalized corruption, and arms trafficking, among other things. Second, the operations and their consequences have increased in scope and gravity over the last two decades. Third, they create dramatic impacts on agents and agencies of national security, on good governance, and in military, political, and economic ways. Fourth, the sovereignty of many countries is subject to infringement by both state and nonstate actors because of drugs.

Two decades ago, most Caribbean leaders were reluctant to accept that their countries were facing a drug threat. However, over the years the scope and severity of the threat increased and became patently obvious to observers within and outside the region. Caribbean leaders no longer were able to deny the existence of the threat. Helping to catapult the issue onto the policy radar screen was the sobering assertion made by the West Indian Commission in 1992: "Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in Caricom countries than the drug problem; and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional Governments more."[17] Thus, it was understandable that at the special Caribbean Community (CARICOM) drug summit of December 1996, leaders would acknowledge, "Narco-trafficking and its associated evils of money laundering, gun smuggling, corruption of public officials, criminality and drug abuse constitute the major security threat[s] to the Caribbean today."[18]

Furthermore, in June 2000, at a multinational high-level meeting on criminal justice in Trinidad and Tobago, that country's attorney general made the following declaration in speaking on behalf of the Caribbean:

> There is a direct nexus between illegal drugs and crimes of violence, sex crimes, domestic violence, maltreatment of children by parents and other evils. . . . Our citizens suffer from drug addiction, drug-related violence, and drug-related corruption of law enforcement and public officials. The drug lords have become a law unto themselves. . . . Aside from the very visible decimation of our societies caused by drug addiction and drug-related violence, there is another insidious evil: money laundering. . . . It changes democratic institutions, erodes the rule of law, and destroys civic order with impunity.[19]

Crime

The above statement by Attorney General Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj points clearly to the nexus between drugs and crime. Several things are noteworthy in this respect. First, murder, theft, and assault and bodily harm, the crimes that present the greatest challenge to most countries in the region, are precisely the crimes associated with drugs. This is particularly true in relation to Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. For instance, in Jamaica, where there were 561 reported cases of murder in 1991, "there was a 75 per cent increase [over 1990] in the incidents of murder linked directly or indirectly to drug trafficking."[20] A decade later the murder rate had more than doubled: to 1,131 murders in 2001, 28 percent more than in the year 2000 and a significant proportion of them drug related.[21]

Also noteworthy is the fact that the countries with the highest or most progressive crime reports in the theft, homicide, and serious assault categories are the same ones featuring prominently over the last decade as centers of drug activity. These countries include the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guyana, and St. Kitts-Nevis. Thus, what the Jamaican National Security Minister reported to Parliament in June 2002 has a relevance that extends far beyond Jamaica: "Madame Speaker, when you look at a breakdown of the murder figures, it becomes clear that reprisals and drug/gang related killings constitute the highest percentage of murders in the country. . . . Current analysis based on available intelligence suggests that the illegal drug trade has become the taproot for crime and violence in our country today. It has become the principal factor underpinning the organized criminal networks, which are at the heart of the problem."[22]

Dudley Allen, a former Jamaican Commissioner of Corrections, once remarked, "It is no longer possible to think of crime as a simple or minor social problem. . . . Mounting crime and violence have been declared leading national problems, and the issue of law and order has assumed high priority in national planning and policymaking. Fear of crime is destroying . . . freedom of movement, freedom from harm, and freedom from fear itself."[23] Allen first made this statement in 1976, but it is still relevant 27 years later and now even more dramatically so. He was speaking mainly in the Jamaican context, but his observation now has region-wide validity.

For a variety of reasons that cannot be explored here, crime has skyrocketed in many parts of the region. It was the widespread regional scope and the severity of crime that prompted CARICOM leaders to create the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security at their July 2001 summit in Nassau, Bahamas. The interim report of the Task Force, which was presented to the leaders at the July 2002 summit in Georgetown, Guyana, testifies to the widespread scope and severity of crime. (The report also examines some of the complex reasons for crime and provides both policy and operational recommendations for coping with it.)[24]

There is a local-global nexus in the region's drug-related crime, reflected in the fact that the crime is not all ad hoc, local crime; some of it is transnational and organized, extending beyond the region to North America, Europe, and elsewhere.[25] Groups called "posses" in Canada, the Caribbean, and the United States and "yardies" in Britain perpetrate the most notorious organized crime. They are organized criminal gangs composed primarily of Jamaicans or people of Jamaican descent but increasingly involving African-Americans, Guyanese, Panamanians, Trinidadians, Nigerians, and Dominicans. Although the posses are known most for the trafficking of drugs and weapons, they also have been implicated in money laundering, fraud, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, prostitution, documents forgery, and murder.

Another aspect of the local-global nexus pertains to deportees. Criminal activity within some Caribbean countries is complicated and aggravated by the activities of nationals who are convicted, sentenced, and later deported from elsewhere. In a July 1993 speech to the Jamaican Parliament, National Security Minister K.D. Knight stated, "Nearly a thousand Jamaicans were deported from other countries last year, with over 700 coming from the United States. Most of them, nearly 600, were deported for drug-related offenses."[26] That was just the tip of the iceberg. Between 1993 and 2000, more than 8,000 Jamaican deportees were returned to the island, mainly from the United States.

Although most of the deportees come from the United States, the United States is not the only country that sends criminals back to their homelands. Of course, Jamaica is not the only Caribbean nation to be forced to accept nationals from the diaspora who have walked on the wrong side of the law. As a matter of fact, Jamaica is not the Caribbean country to which most deportees are returned. That dubious distinction falls to the Dominican Republic. Moreover, criminal deportation is also an intra-regional reality; Caribbean countries send each other's nationals back to their countries of origin. Barbados, for example, reportedly deports an average of 20 Caribbean nationals weekly, mostly to Guyana, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.[27]

Yet, it is not merely the fact of deportation and the numbers that are troubling to many Caribbean jurisdictions. Part of the challenge lies in the fact that deportees generally have a troubling criminal profile, with the capabilities and disposition to perpetrate crime in the new jurisdiction. Moreover, because of economic deprivation, there are ample opportunities for the committal of crime. When these factors are combined with the manpower, equipment, and training deficiencies of Caribbean law enforcement agencies, the outcomes negatively affect state and society in the region.[28]

Calling the deportee matter a "contested issue," the report of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security quite rightly calls for more empirical study of the relationships between criminal deportation and domestic criminal behavior. Overall, it offers measured commentary, noting that ". . . a basic descriptive study of the Barbadian deportee problem and preliminary studies in Jamaica would seem to support the idea that the deportee danger may have been overestimated." Nevertheless, it makes the following point: "Although imperfect, the existing information suggests that there is nothing particularly dramatic about the quantitative impact of deportee crimes. The qualitative impact of deportee crimes is, however, of great concern."[29]

Understandably, while crime is widespread in scope, it is not uniform in pattern. Over recent years, the jurisdictions that stand out in relation to violent crime have been Jamaica, Haiti, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. Yet, in some places where crime has come to define the national image if not the socio-political landscape, crime actually has declined. For instance:

- In May 2002, Trinidad's National Security Minister, Howard Chin Lee, reported that the murder rate for February to April 2002 had dropped by 14 percent compared with the same period in 2001;[30]
- In August 2002, Jamaica's National Security Minister indicated that murders had declined by 11 percent over the last year; rape had been reduced by 11 percent also; carnal abuse by 17 percent, and breaking and entering by 14 percent;[31]

- On January 3, 2003, Jamaica's Commissioner of Police announced that the country's 1,045 reported homicides in 2002 represented an 8 percent decline in the homicides for 2001; the number of people killed with guns in 2002 was 711, while it was 789 in 2001; robberies declined from 1,523 in 2001 to 1,392 in 2002; indeed, there was a decrease in almost every area of major crime in 2002, compared with 2002, except for shootings and larceny.[32]

However, there have been virtual crime sprees elsewhere, notably in Haiti, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, with dramatic episodes of criminal temerity and new or heightened criminal forays. These include attacks on police stations (already happening in Jamaica, Haiti, and elsewhere), kidnappings, and assassination of law enforcement officials. Indeed, it has been said regarding Guyana: "Even to those untrained in the detection of patterns of criminal behavior, it now appears obvious that Guyana has transcended the bounds of ordinary banditry and is engulfed in a crime wave that suggests methodological planning, sinister motives, and the lethal means to stun the nation into a state of fear-induced vulnerability."[33]

A new murder record was set in Guyana in November 2002: 14 criminal murders in the capital and neighboring towns and villages within a 25-day period (November 4-29), along with three killings by the police as they tried to cope with the crime spree.[34] Needless to say, political discontent in Guyana, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, with an overlay of racial issues in some cases, has served to complicate the situation in those countries. Nevertheless, as was suggested earlier, crime is but one of several security challenges facing Caribbean nations; important, too, are terrorism and HIV/AIDS.

Terrorism

Brian Jenkins was correct in calling terrorism "violence for effect." Terrorism is, he maintains, "not only, and sometimes not at all, for the effect on the actual victims of the terrorists. In fact, the victims may be totally unrelated to the terrorists' cause."[35] Terrorism — and the consequences of state actions to cope with it — have become unwelcome, but undeniable, realities for citizens of the United States and elsewhere, including the Caribbean. Terrorism and its consequences have given new meanings to the definitions of power and of powerlessness.

The assessment of one respected international politics scholar in this regard warrants full replication: "Our failure to anticipate the impact of terrorist attacks does not derive from a fundamental conceptual failure in thinking about power. On the contrary, the power of terrorists, like that of states, derives from asymmetrical patterns of interdependence. Our fault has rather been our failure to understand that the most powerful state ever to exist on this planet could be vulnerable to small bands of terrorists because of patterns of asymmetrical interdependence. *We have overemphasized states and we have overexaggerated power.*"[36]

What, then, does 9-11 mean for weak, vulnerable states in the Caribbean? The 9-11 attack has affected the Caribbean in several ways, as a direct consequence of the economic and military fallout from the impact on the United States and as a result of the region's security vulnerability. It is notable, for instance, that according to the U.S. Department of State, some 160 Caribbean nationals were victims of the actions against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Moreover, the domino effect of 9-11 has had a deleterious effect on the region's tourism industry, which is key to the economic security of several countries. A few examples should suffice.

In Jamaica, where tourism earns some US$1.2 billion per year and employs more than 30,000 people, the impact was dramatic: Air Jamaica lost US$11 million within the week following the attack. In Barbados, where tourism contributes about US$1 billion to the economy, the authorities anticipated a US$30.3 million decline in receipts, a 30-35 percent reduction in the cruise enterprise, US$857,000 less from the head tax, and a drop in tourist spending of US$9.2 million.[37] Indeed, the tourism impact is expected to be so far reaching that the Second Caribbean Tourism Summit, held in the Bahamas on December 8-9, 2001, decided on a package of special measures to salvage the industry, which in 2000 provided gross foreign exchange earnings of US$20.2 billion and employed an estimated 1 in 4 persons in the Caribbean.[38]

Undoubtedly, though, the impact goes beyond tourism. As CARICOM leaders noted at the October 2001 special summit: "We are concerned that the attacks and subsequent developments have been especially devastating to our tourism, aviation, financial services, and agricultural sectors, which are the major contributors to our [gross domestic product] GDP, foreign exchange earnings and to employment in our Region. We are particu-

larly conscious that our ongoing efforts to combat money laundering must now take specific account of the potential for abuse of financial services industries by terrorists, their agents, and supporters in all jurisdictions."[39] Needless to say, some of the very realities of the region's geopolitics and geonarcotics can create opportunities for terrorist engagements, either as ends in themselves or allied to drug (or illegal migrant smuggling) operations.[40]

A scholarly assessment of the economic, political, military, and other impacts and implications for the Caribbean of terrorism is being undertaken elsewhere.[41] Nevertheless, it is useful to note that several effects in addition to those mentioned above have begun to be felt in the immigration, banking, transportation, and other areas.[42] Moreover, CARICOM's Regional Task Force on Crime and Security raised the prospects of several likely threat possibilities:

- The region's maritime and air networks could be used for conveyance of terrorist operatives and operational assets.
- Terrorists could use the region's banking and other financial systems to finance their pursuits.
- Regional port or air facilities could be used to stage terrorist operations, either targeted to places in the region or elsewhere.[43]

It certainly is crucial to discuss scenarios and possibilities of external terrorist actions and their collateral impacts. Still, it should be remembered that although the Caribbean was not the target of 9-11 terrorist operations, the region has not been immunized against terrorism. Haitian scholar (and, later, politician) Leslie Manigat noted quite rightly that although the transition from colonial rule to independence in the Anglophone Caribbean was largely peaceful and nonviolent, there were notable "ideologically Zionist" bombings in Trinidad, "independencia bombings" in Puerto Rico, and "nationalist bombings" in Guadeloupe. Moreover, there was the fatal car bombing of scholar-politician Walter Rodney in Guyana in June 1980 and the destruction of 11 Puerto Rican Nationalist Guard planes, worth US$45 million, in January 1981 by the Puerto Rican nationalist group called Macheteros.[44]

Undoubtedly, though, the most devastating terrorist incident within the Caribbean occurred on October 6, 1976, when a bomb aboard a Cubana Air flight from Guyana to Cuba was detonated shortly after departing Barbados, where it had made a transit stop. All 73 people on the flight — 57 Cubans, 11 Guyanese, and five North Koreans — were killed. Anti-Castro exiles based in Venezuela later claimed responsibility for the action. (On August 1, 1998, while on a visit to Barbados, President Fidel Castro dedicated a monument to the victims of the incident.)[45] Moreover, Cuba suffered a dozen bombings of tourist locations during 1997, allegedly perpetrated by anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami and Central America.[46]

The Terror of HIV/AIDS

In many respects, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has created a form of terror for the Caribbean. It has been traced to the 1980s with the first case reported in Jamaica in 1982, just one year after the first reported case in the United States. The following year, eight cases involving gay or bisexual men were reported in Trinidad and Tobago. Just two years later, in 1985, female and pediatric AIDS cases made up about 28 percent of total cases reported to the Caribbean Epidemiology Center (CAREC) by its 22 member countries.[47] Among other things, this indicated that the disease was becoming a concern for the general population and not merely a problem restricted to gay or bisexual men.[48]

The epidemic has spread rapidly since 1982. The following report was published in March 2002:

> The alarming acceleration of the epidemic is highlighted by the fact that more AIDS cases have been reported between 1995 and 1998 than since the beginning of the epidemic in the early 1980s. In 1998, among the CAREC countries, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Bermuda, Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname reported the highest number of new AIDS cases. Overall, Haiti and the Dominican Republic together account for 85 percent of the total number of cases in the Caribbean. However, because of their size and tourism dependent economies, the small island nations remain vulnerable to the epidemic.[49]

Indeed, the AIDS epidemic has spread so rapidly that the Caribbean is the second hardest-hit region, the first being sub-Saharan Africa, with an overall prevalence of 2.11 percent among adults and 501,500 people living with the virus, up to the end of 2000.[50] Figures 3 provides a dramatic portrait of the pandemic. Understandably, there is variability both in the prevalence among countries and in the impact on differing segments of the populations of countries.

For example, data for 2000 indicate the

Figure 3. Reported AIDS Cases in CAREC Member Countries: 1982-2000



Source: Bilali Camara, *20 Years of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the Caribbean*, Caribbean Epidemiology Center, 2002.

following incidence among infants: Jamaica, 225 children or 5 per 1,000 live births; Trinidad and Tobago, 108 children or 6 per 1,000 live births; Belize, 105 children or 15 per 1,000 live births; and Guyana, 420 children or 21 per 1,000 live births.[51] However, it is not only the number of people involved that makes the HIV/AIDS epidemic a security matter for the region; what makes it so serious are the demographic, economic, and social implications and the impact on the long-term socioeconomic stability and governability of Caribbean nations.

For instance, 73 percent of the cases reported between 1982 and 2000 are in the 15 years to 44 years age range, a range critical for the region's economic and social productivity. One study put the total direct and indirect cost for the CAREC region in 1995 at US$20 million and predicted a rise to US$80 million in 2020. Moreover, it estimated that in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, the GNP will be lowered by 4.2 percent and 6.4 percent, respectively; and that savings will decline by 10.3 percent in Trinidad and 23.5 percent in Jamaica.[52] One expert notes that indirect costs include the following: losses on societal investment in persons dying prematurely; costs for the care of orphans; additional health care costs due to the increased incidence of other diseases, ensuring the safety of blood supplies, laboratory, and hospital precautions; and health education and other prevention measures. Also, it is estimated that by 2010 the region's population will be 95 percent of what it would have been without AIDS, and a mere 92 percent by 2020.[53]

Understandably, there are other long-term effects on the demographics of Caribbean countries. One example will suffice. As the disease disproportionately affects younger age groups, one could expect life expectancy to decline over time. And, suggests the Partnership for AIDS report, "As more people are generally expected to live for shorter periods of time, their expected contributions to national economic and social development becomes smaller and less reliable. This is of particular concern in small countries that lose large numbers of skilled individuals that are not easily replaced." [54]

For all these reasons, this writer is convinced that HIV/AIDS is not simply a health crisis. It also is a security challenge. This is fairly obvious when one remembers the definition of security outlined earlier and considers the deleterious impact the disease will have on the capacity of Caribbean states in the next 10 to 15 years to provide and sustain human capital and security-related capabilities. Human capital and security-related capabilities are needed not only for governments to maintain formal-legal sovereignty over their states, but also for them to be able to exercise positive sovereignty, which entails having the economic, technical, military, and other capabilities to declare, implement, and enforce public policy at the domestic and international levels.[55]

For reasons related to smallness, capability limitations, vulnerability, and the nature of the challenges facing the region, it should come as no surprise that a multidimensional strategy is the only sound and credible one Caribbean states could adopt to cope with the challenges outlined above. The multidimensional approach has several elements. Among other things, it entails adopting reactive and proactive measures unilaterally and in tandem with other actors, both state and nonstate. In relation to cooperation, it means engaging bilaterally as well as multilaterally and doing so simultaneously. Although neither the mandate of this Agenda Paper nor the space available allows for exploration of the multiple dimensions involved, it is important to offer a commentary on a key aspect of the multidimensional strategy: regional engagement.

Regional Engagement

It is apposite to note here that especially in the aftermath of 9-11, the factor of Caribbean geographic proximity has given a new dimension to U.S. national security sensitivities and has led to an interesting twist in relation to vulnerability. It no longer is the case that the Caribbean is vulnerable because of the Leviathan in the North. It is now also the case that the security of the United States

Figure 4. Geographic Areas of Responsibility for the United States Military



Source: U.S. Department of Defense, 2002. <http://www.pentagon.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/>.

homeland is vulnerable to "penetration" from the geographically proximate Caribbean.

This vulnerability was dramatized several times between October 2002 and February 2003. For instance, on October 30, 2002, a dilapidated Haitian freighter with some 220 Haitians seeking refuge landed in Key Biscayne, Florida, having made the trip from Haiti undetected by U.S. military and law enforcement personnel until it was too late to prevent the landing. Another, more recent, case occurred when four uniformed and armed defectors from Cuba's Border Guards were able to make their way undetected on a 30-foot go-fast boat across the Florida Straits and arrive at Key West Florida, home of the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-East, on February 7, 2003. Incidentally, that episode happened six days after five Cuban fishermen landed on U.S. Naval property in Key West close to a cruise ship.[56] Of course, such incidents raise natural "What if?" questions in relation to terrorism and other threats to the United States.

Thus, there is every reason to believe that proximity and vulnerability were among factors U.S. national security policymakers took into consideration in designing the architecture of homeland security in the aftermath of 9-11. Therefore, it is important to make a brief comment on this architecture in relation to the Caribbean before proceeding to the discussion about the regional environment.

The Caribbean in the Homeland Security Architecture

Early in 1996, then Secretary of Defense William Perry announced changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) that expanded the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), adding the waters adjoining Central and South America and the Gulf of Mexico.[57] This was done ostensibly to enhance SOUTHCOM's interactions with the navies of Central and South American nations and to have one commander control all U.S. military activities in the Caribbean Basin and South America. The change occurred in two phases. Phase I, effective January 1 of that year, gave SOUTHCOM authority over the area adjoining Central and South America. Phase II took effect from June 1, 1996, and in-

volved SOUTHCOM's control over the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Hence, in relation to foreign military and security relations with the Caribbean, SOUTHCOM became the operational point of contact, replacing the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM).[58]

As one could appreciate, 9-11 precipitated a major revision of the UCP. The revision, which became effective October 1, 2002, has several key elements, including

- Increasing to 10 the number of geographic and functional commands, including the Creation of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM);
- Merger of the Space Command and the Strategic Command into an expanded Strategic Command (STRATCOM); and
- Realignment of the missions of several commands, including SOUTHCOM, Joint Forces Command, and the European Command.[59]

The five geographic commands, shown in Figure 4, are European, Pacific, Southern, Central, and Northern. The five functional commands are Space, Strategic, Transportation, Special Operations, and Joint Forces (formerly Atlantic). The geographic commands of relevance to the Caribbean are NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, as Figure 5 shows. NORTHCOM, which is headquartered at the Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, has an AOR that covers the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding waters out to 500 miles. Its mission entails preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggression directed toward U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure. As regards the Caribbean, although Figure 5 shows Cuba, the Bahamas, and a few other places as being within the NORTHCOM sphere, SOUTHCOM remains responsible for contingency planning, operations, security, and force protection for Cuba, the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.[60]

The Regional Cooperation Environment

The regional security environment of the Caribbean requires regional security cooperation with multidimensional, multi-agency, and multi-level features. The regional level is but one of several zones of engagement, which I call *Multilateral Security Engagement (MSE) Zones* and define as geographic spaces for policy and operational

Figure 5. The Caribbean Within NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM Areas of Responsibility



collaboration and cooperation by state and nonstate actors in relation to defense and security matters. Essentially, the Zones exist at the subregional, regional, hemispheric, and international systemic levels.

As Figure 6 indicates, although the zones are relatively discrete spaces, they are not exclusive spaces; they overlap. Also, as Figure 6 and Table 3 reveal, each MSE Zone has several state — both governmental and international governmental — entities, and nonstate actors. (The agencies and networks are not listed in order of importance.) For reasons related to capabilities and national interest, U.S. governmental agencies and U.S.-led networks play key roles in some regional and hemispheric engagements, as Figure 6 suggests.[61] So, too, do a few British and Canadian agencies, notably Scotland Yard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), although these are not show in the illustration. Engagement instruments, such as treaties, conventions, memorandums of understanding, and protocols, guide the subregional, regional, and other actors, creating them and setting their terms of engagement. Understandably, there is a mixed record of implementation and success of the various engagements. One could appreciate, too, that operating within the MSE Zones also would carry many challenges. These deserve some attention.

Table 3. Agencies and Networks in the Multilateral Security Engagement Zones+*

Sub-regional Engagement Zone
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
Regional Security System (RSS)

Regional Engagement Zone
Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP)
Association of Caribbean States (ACS)
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Caribbean Coordination Mechanism (CCM)
Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC)
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA)
Caribbean Epimediology Center (CAREC)
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF)
Caribbean Information Sharing Network (CISN)
Caribbean Inter-Ministerial Drug Control Training Center (CIFAD)
Caribbean Law Enforcement and Intelligence Committee (CLEIC)
Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC)
Regional Drug Training Center (REDTRAC)

Hemispheric Engagement Zone
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) [Department of Justice]
Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) [Department of Homeland Security]
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) [Department of Justice]
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [Department of Treasury]
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) [Department of Treasury]
Inland Revenue Service (IRS) [Department of Treasury]
Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)
Inter-American Defense College (IADC)
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) [Justice]
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) [Department of State]
Joint Interagency Task Force–East (JIATF-E) [Department of Defense]
Organization of American States (OAS)
Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO)
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) [Department of Homeland Security]
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

International Systemic Engagement Zone
European Union (EU)
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
World Health Organization (WHO)

Notes:

+ Agencies and networks do not fall exclusively within the Zones with which they are identified.

* This is not a list of all agencies and networks in the Zones, just a representative group.

Figure 6. Multilateral Security Engagement Zones



Challenges of Regional Engagement

As might be expected, working within the MSE Zones entails facing and working through several challenges, among them challenges related to setting and maintaining priorities, institutionalizing agreements, cooperating with other state and nonstate actors, and sharing intelligence with other actors.[62] Attention will be paid here to the first three areas. Of course, prioritization, institutionalization, cooperation, and intelligence-sharing challenges are not the only possible ones related to engagement in the Zones. Further, these challenges exist not only in relation to regional collaboration; most of them also exist in bilateral relationships and in relation to interactions at the hemispheric and international levels.

The Prioritization Challenge

Prioritization is necessary for several reasons. First, the multidimensionality of the security challenges means that multidimensionality needs to be an inherent feature of responding to them. Yet, and this is the second reason, the states involved

are all small states with various budgetary, manpower, technical, intelligence, and other capability limitations.

Beyond this, as security issues are not the only issues on the national agendas of countries, resources have to be allocated to other areas, such as health, education, and housing. National and regional as well as hemispheric and international decisionmakers, therefore, have to undertake the unenviable task of setting priorities. This should be done in some rational way, guided by some policy framework or plan, rather than in an ad hoc manner. The consequences of the latter — and there is evidence of this consequence within the Caribbean and the Americas — results in a suboptimal use of resources, sometimes a waste of resources, and little appreciable mitigation impact on the challenge at hand.

The Institutionalization Challenge

A key test of the commitment of many states to confront the security challenges facing them meaningfully and to engage in regional solutions of those challenges is their willingness to institutionalize the multilateral engagement regime instruments by incorporating them adequately into national policy. In practical terms, this can be judged, among other things, by the following criteria:

1. Whether they sign, and later ratify, the existing multilateral engagement instrument — treaty, convention, memorandum of understanding, or protocol.
2. Whether they procrastinate on such action or act with deliberate speed.
3. Whether they adopt enabling, supporting, or collateral legislation or other domestic policy instruments.

Some countries have a poor record when it comes to sustaining and sometimes merely launching initiatives. This is often because of financial, technical, human resources, or other capability limitations, but often it is due to simple neglect flowing from lack of political will or administrative lethargy, or both. Sometimes it is a manifestation of what might be called the "solution by platitudes syndrome" found in the hemisphere. This behavior occurs when political elites appear to believe that the delivery of a grand speech or proclamation or the signing of a convention or treaty ipso facto solves the problem at hand; they do not seem to take responsibility for devising and following through on the next steps, the implementation and institutionalization plans that are vital to solving extant problems. Political and bureaucratic elites, therefore, need to recognize that meaningful regional or other multilateral engagement requires rising above platitudes and going beyond signings. As leaders, they must either follow through, institutionalize, and implement appropriately themselves or delegate these tasks to individuals who are held accountable.

The Cooperation Challenge

The security challenges discussed earlier clearly are transnational in nature; they are "interdependence issues," to use James Rosenau's conceptual construct: "issues that are distinguished from conventional issues by the fact that they span national boundaries and thus cannot be addressed much less resolved through actions undertaken at the national or local level."[63] Hence, actions to cope with security challenges must be commensurately transnational. This necessitates cooperation, which needs to be both bilateral and multilateral. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive; it is not a case of either bilateral cooperation or multilateral cooperation, but how much of both is desirable or needed. Indeed, many times bilateral measures are preferred, as generally they can be designed and implemented more quickly.

The cooperation challenge lies partly in the fact that whether viewed in bilateral or multilateral terms, the need for cooperation raises the prospect that conflict may ensue in relation to capabilities and sovereignty, among other things. Capability disputes between or among cooperating states do not arise merely because of the actual money, equipment, and other constraints on the part of partners. They often occur because inherent in the capability disparities of cooperating partners is the expectation that those with fewer limitations will give relatively more to the collective effort. This is likely to be especially so in a multilateral context, where there are many actors and when just a few of them having meaningful resource capacities.

Effective cooperation is not always achievable for a variety of reasons, including political leadership changes within countries, public opinion within the more resource-endowed states, and the fact that policymakers in the relatively better-off states are sometimes unsure that there will be commensurate national interest returns on their nation's investments in the collective project. It is not that they are against collaboration; sometimes there is uncertainty or rethinking about the amount of investment to be made in the various response

mixes — unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral — and the form that investment should take.

The cooperation challenge has an additional dimension, which pertains to cooperation between and among agencies *within* countries. Problems spawned by bureaucratic politics give rise to jurisdictional and turf battles and coordination difficulties between army and coast guard, army intelligence and police intelligence, health ministries and trade ministries, foreign affairs ministries and national security ministries, and so on. Thus, the importance of cooperation within countries deserves the same emphasis as cooperation between and among countries. They are merely two dimensions of the cooperation challenge. Coexisting with it is the coordination challenge, which is compounded when more organizations, cooperative agreements, and missions are added to the regional environment. This is especially problematic for the smaller states in the region, whose capability limitations become more pronounced, with the prospect that "the science of muddling through" becomes real.

Conclusion

It is hoped that this Agenda Paper has offered readers an appreciation of some of the continuity and change dynamics in relation to the security challenges facing Caribbean states and societies at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The challenges and implications of the "old" and "new" realities are such that one is inclined to revise the famous assertion by Charles Dickens in his classic novel, *A Tale of Two Cities*, "It was the best of times, it was the worst of times" to become, "It is the worst of times; it is the worst possible time to have the worst of times."

Note, though, that the challenges are transnational "interdependence issues," to use the construct of scholar James Rosenau, and "problems without borders," in the words of international statesman Kofi Annan.[64] Consequently, collective responses are not only desirable but necessary. And, while regional and other cooperation surely brings its own challenges, the numerous actions and achievements within various Multilateral Security Engagement Zones provide reasons to have hope for the future. Clearly, the "battles" being fought in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the hemisphere are largely nontraditional ones. They oblige us to question the wisdom of paying intellectual homage to theories and paradigms that have long lost their utility in explaining and interpreting actual realities in our regions. Especially because these are largely nontraditional "battles," the statement by French statesman Georges Clémenceau that "War is too important to be left to generals" assumes new relevance.

NOTES

1. *Exiting the Whirlpool* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001), 20.

2. Owen Arthur, "Address" at the Inaugural Session of the 32nd General Assembly of the Organization of American States, Bridgetown, Barbados, June 2, 2002, 2.

3. See Commonwealth Advisory Group, *A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997), 9.

4. See, for example, Commonwealth Study Group, *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985), 15.

5. Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), *Annual Report 2001* (Bridgetown, Barbados, March 2002), 22-23.

6. Address by L. Erskine Sandiford, Prime Minister of Barbados to 1990 CARICOM Summit in "Communiqué and Addresses—Eleventh Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community," *CARICOM Perspective* (Special Supplement) 49 (July-December) 1990: 6.

7. For a recent explanation of Realism and application of the theory, see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001). Mearsheimer calls his variant "offensive realism."

8. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities," *International Studies Quarterly* 37: (June) 1993: 141.

9. Robert O. Keohane, "The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the 'Liberalism of Fear,'" *Dialog-IO*, Spring 2002: 41.

10. Richard Falk, "Theory, Realism, and World Security," in *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End,* eds. Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 10.

11. For some of the evidence of this, see Alma H. Young and Dion E. Phillips, eds., *Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986); Anthony T. Bryan, J. Edward Greene, and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., *Peace, Development, and Security in the Caribbean* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Ivelaw L. Griffith, ed., *Strategy and Security in the Caribbean* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1991); and Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Caribbean Security: Retrospect and Prospect," *Latin American Research Review*, 30: 2, 1995: 3-32.

12. This definition was developed initially in Chapter 1 of Ivelaw L Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).

13. Owen Arthur, "Address," 3.

14. Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000), 178.

15. For a discussion of contemporary geopolitical issues, see Ramón Grosfoguel, "Migration and Geopolitics in the Caribbean: The Cases of Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica," in *Free Markets, Open Societies, Closed Societies?: Trends in International Migration and Immigration Policy in the Americas, ed. Max J. Castro* (Coral Gables, Fla.: North-South Center Press at the University of Miami, 1999); and Ivelaw L. Griffith, "U.S. Strategic Interests in Caribbean Security," *Joint Force Quarterly,* Autumn 2000, 64-69. For a discussion of geoeconomic and geopolitical consequences of 9-11, see Richard Bernal, "The Aftershock of 9/11: Implications for Globalization and World Politics," The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10, September 2002.

16. This concept was developed in Ivelaw L. Griffith, "From Cold War Geopolitics to Post-Cold War Geonarcotics," *International Journal* 48 (Winter) 1993-1994: 1-36. For empirical studies based on it, see Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press 1997); and Padideh Tosti, "GPEN: Framing Narcopolitics," Security Policy Group International Working Paper, 2002, at <*www.spgi.org/articles/tosti_gpen.shtml*>.

17. West Indian Commission, *Time For Action* (Bridgetown, Barbados, 1992), 343. The Commission was a group of 15 eminent individuals created by CARICOM leaders in 1989 to help chart a course for the region into the twenty-first century. Sir Shirdat Ramphal, former Foreign Minister of Guyana and Secretary General of the Commonwealth of Nations and at the time Chancellor of both the University of Guyana and the University of the West Indies, headed it. Needless to say, the Commission's statement had a relevance extending beyond the CARICOM group of countries.

18. *Communiqué, Fifth Special Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community*, Bridgetown, Barbados, December 16, 1996, 2.

19. *Remarks by the Hon. Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj, Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago at the Opening of the Caribbean-United-States-European-Canadian Ministerial (Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement) Conference*, Port of Spain, Trinidad, June 12-13, 2000. At <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/islands/maharaj.htm>.

20. Planning Institute of Jamaica, *Economic and Social Survey 1991* (Kingston, 1992), 21.3-21.4.

21. See "1,131 Violent Deaths," *Jamaica Gleaner,* December 31, 2001, at <*www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20011231/news/news3.html*>.

22. "Restoring Law and Order in Society," Presentation by Dr. the Hon. Peter Phillips, Minister of National Security, 2002-2003 Budget Sectoral Debate, June 18, 2002, 7, 10.

23. Dudley Allen, "Urban Crime and Violence in Jamaica," in *Crime and Punishment in the Caribbean*, eds. Rosemary Brana-Shute and Gary Brana-Shute (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida, 1980), 29.

24. *Report of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security to the Heads of Governments and States of the Caribbean Community and Common Market*, CARICOM Secretariat, Georgetown, Guyana, July 2002.

25. For more on transnational crime in the Caribbean, see Douglas Farah, "Russian Mob Sets Sights on Caribbean," *Miami Herald*, September 29, 1997, 8A; Anthony P. Maingot, "The Decentralization Imperative and Caribbean Criminal Enterprise," in *Transnational Crime in the Americas*, ed. Tom Farer (New York: Routledge, 1999), 143-170; Anthony T. Bryan, *Transnational Organized Crime: The Caribbean Context,* Working Paper No. 1, The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center, University of Miami, October 2000; and Charles Clifton Leacock, "Internationalization of Crime," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 34 (Fall) 2001: 263-279. Leacock is the Director of Public Prosecutions in Barbados.

26. Parliament of Jamaica, *Presentation of the Hon. K.D. Knight, Minister of National Security and Justice.* Budget Sectoral Debate, July 15, 1993, 11.

27. See Maria Bradshaw, "Illegal Haven," The *Nation,* June 5, 2002, 1.

28. For more on the issue of deportees, see Margaret H. Taylor and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, *Deportation of Criminal Aliens: A Geopolitical Perspective*, Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper, June 1998; Ivelaw L. Griffith, "The Drama of Deportation," *Caribbean Perspectives* Issue 5, January 1999, 10-14; and Privat Precil, "Criminal Deportees and Returned Teens: A Migration Phenomenon, A Social Problem," at <www.panosinst.org/Haiti/h5-99e.shtml#Caribbean>.

29. *Report of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security to the Heads of Governments and States of the Caribbean Community and Common Market*, CARICOM Secretariat, Georgetown, Guyana, July 2002, Section 6, 4. An interesting experience for Jamaica, mostly unrelated to drugs, is the increasing deportation of children from the United Kingdom over recent years. See "More Jamaicans Minors Being Deported," *Jamaica Gleaner*, January 5, 2003, 1.

30. See "Trinidad Businessmen Seek Better Security after Kidnapping," *Jamaica Gleaner*, May 14, 2002, at <www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20020514/business/business1.html>.

31. See "Project Launched to Reduce Crime Among the Youth," *Jamaica Gleaner*, August 27, 2002, at <http://www.jamaica-gleaner/gleaner/20020827/lead/lead1.html>.

32. "Police Commissioner Targets 20 Percent Reduction in Homicides," *Jamaica Information Service Press Release*, January 4, 2003.

33. "Crime: From Bad to Worse," *Guyana Review* 10: 116 (August) 2002: 16.

34. See "Death Warrant," *Guyana Review* Vol. 10, No. 120 (December) 2002: 20-23. Ironically, the November 2002 crime spree began the day the nation began observing Deepavali, the Hindu festival that celebrates the conquering of darkness by light.

35. Brian Jenkins, *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict* (Los Angeles: Crescent Publications, 1975), 1.

36. Keohane, "The Globalization of Informal Violence," 35. Emphasis in the original.

37. Anthony T. Bryan and Stephen E. Flynn, *Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security*, North-South Center Update, October 22, 2001, 5.

38. See "Meeting the Challenge of Change: Address Delivered by the Secretary General of the Caribbean Tourism Organization, Jean Holder, at the Second Caribbean Tourism Summit, Nassau, December 8-9, 2001," 1. Holder provides a comprehensive analysis of the travails of tourism.

39. *Nassau Declaration on International Terrorism: The Caricom Response Issued at the Conclusion of the Special (Emergency) Meeting of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community*, October 11-12, 2001, The Bahamas, 1.

40. Narco-terrorist possibilities prompted an August 2002 U.S. congressional visit to the region, led by Rep. Mark E. Souder, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, of the Committee on Government Reform, to hold talks with security, corporate, and other officials. See David Paulin, "Congressional Team Warns of Powerful Narco-terrorist Alliance in the Caribbean," *The Jamaica Observer Internet Edition*, August 21, 2002, at <http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20020821T210000-05>.

41. This assessment is being done by a group of Caribbean, European, and North American scholars, policymakers, and security practitioners and is led by this writer. It will be published in Spring 2004 as Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, ed., *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers).

42. See, for instance, "Caribbean Drug Traffic up 25%: U.S. Law Enforcement Focusing on Terrorism," *The Baltimore Sun*, October 18, 2001; Greg Fields, "Caymans to Share Information on Bank Customers with U.S.," *Miami Herald*, November 28, 2001.

43. *Report of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security*, Section 5, 1.

44. Leslie Manigat, "The Setting: Crisis, Ideology, and Geopolitics," in *The Caribbean and World Politics*, eds. Jorge Heine and Leslie Manigat (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), 35.

45. For an examination of the incident, see Dion E. Phillips, "Terrorism and Security in the Caribbean: The 1976 Cubana Disaster off Barbados," *Terrorism* Vol. 14/4, 1991: 209-19. Regarding the 1998 dedication, see "Castro to Dedicate Monument to Cubana Crash Victims," *Barbados Nation,* August 1, 1998, 1. For an interesting discussion of the 1976 incident in the context of vicissitudes of Cuban and Cuban-American politics, see Ann Louise Bardach, *Cuba Confidential: Love and Vengeance in Miami and Havana* (New York: Random House, 2002), especially 185-197.

46. See Larry Rohter, "Cuba Arrests Salvadorean in Hotel Blasts," *New York Times*, September 12, 1997; and Ann Louise Bardach and Larry Rohter, "Bomber's Tale: A Cuban Exile Details a 'Horrendous Matter' of a Bombing Campaign," *New York Times*, July 12, 1998.

47. The member countries of CAREC are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos.

48. Bilali Camara, "An Overview of the AIDS/HIV/STD Situation in the Caribbean," in *The Caribbean AIDS Epidemic*, eds. Glenford Howe and Alan Cobley (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2000), 2.

49. Pan-Caribbean Partnership on HIV/AIDS, *The Caribbean Regional Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS 2002-2006*, March 2002, 3.

50. Pan-Caribbean Partnership on HIV/AIDS, 1; and Bilali Camara, "20 Years of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the Caribbean," 2002, Slide No. 3.

51. Camara, "20 Years of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the Caribbean," Slide No. 20.

52. Pan-Caribbean Partnership on HIV/AIDS, 5.

53. Camara, "An Overview," 16.

54. Pan-Caribbean Partnership on HIV/AIDS, 5.

55. The term "positive sovereignty" is used here following the approach by Robert H. Jackson. See his *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 29.

56. See Charles Rabin, Jacqueline Charles, and Martin Merzer, " A Desperate Voyage to Miami: 220 Haitians Run Aground off Causeway," *Miami Herald,* October 30, 2002, 1A; and Jennifer Babson, "Four Cuban Border Guards Arrive in Keys Undetected," *Miami Herald,* February 8, 2003, 1A, 2A.

57. The UPC is the overall military schema that guides all unified commands by a) establishing missions, responsibilities, and force structures; b) delineating geographic areas of responsibilities (for geographic combat commanders); and c) specifying functional responsibilities (for functional commanders).

58. For more on this and other related issues, see Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996); and Humberto García-Muñiz, "The United States and the Caribbean at Fin de Siècle: A Time of Transitions," in *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, eds. Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

59. See Col. Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), "The Impact of Sept. 11, 2001 on the Unified Command Plan," Center for Defense Information Terrorism Project, May 22, 2001; and "Unified Command Plan," at <www.fefenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/>; and "U.S. Northern Command," at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/northern,htm>.

60. See "U.S. Northern Command," at <*www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/northern,htm*>.

61. Indeed, the reliance on the United States is such that a) some engagements would be jeopardized without U.S. funding, if not leadership, and b) the "Caribbean" in some engagements is merely nominal. This raises some troubling issues about whether and to what extent Caribbean interests are served.

62. Some of these challenges were examined in another context elsewhere. See my chapter, "Security Collaboration and Confidence Building in the Americas," in *International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998).

63. James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 106.

64. See Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, 1990; and Kofi Annan, "Foreword," in *World Drug Report 2000,* United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1.